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ABSTRACT
How does a country’s choice of exchange rate regime impact its ability to borrow from abroad? We
build a small open economy model in which the government can potentially respond to shocks via
domestic monetary policy and by international borrowing. We assume that debt repayment must be
incentive compatible when the default punishment is equivalent to permanent exclusion from debt
markets. We compare a ﬂoating regime to full dollarization.
We ﬁnd that dollarization is potentially beneﬁcial, even though it means the loss of the
monetary instrument, precisely because this loss can strengthen incentives to maintain access to
debt markets. Given stronger repayment incentives, more borrowing can be supported, and thus
dollarization can increase international ﬁnancial integration. This prediction of theory is consistent
with the experiences of El Salvador and Ecuador, which recently dollarized, as well as with that
of highly-indebted countries like Italy which adopted the Euro as part of Economic and Monetary
Union: in each case, around the time of regime change, spreads on foreign currency government
debt declined substantially.
∗Arellano: arellano@econ.umn.edu; Heathcote: jhh9@georgetown.edu. The views expressed herein are those
of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve
System.1 Introduction
The recurrence of currency and ﬁnancial crises in emerging markets has generated an intense
debate on the appropriate exchange rate regime. Dollarization has attracted special attention,
in part because of the recent oﬃcial dollarization of Ecuador and El Salvador.1
The key diﬀerence between dollarizing and simply pegging the exchange rate is that dol-
larizing represents more permanent restrictions on domestic monetary policy. Thus thinking
about dollarization leads one to thinking about what a government might have to gain by tying
its hands more tightly with regards to monetary policy, which in turn leads to the issue of
credibility. In discussing papers in a conference volume on the topic of dollarization, Sargent
(2001) writes
“In their papers and verbal discussions, proponents of dollarization often appealed
to commitment and information problems that somehow render dollarization more
credible and more likely to produce good outcomes. Those proponents presented no
models of how dollarization was connected with credibility. We need some models."
In this paper we explore one avenue via which dollarization may increase credibility. In
particular, we develop a model in which dollarization enhances a sovereign borrower’s credibility
in international ﬁnancial markets, and thereby increases international ﬁnancial integration.
Retaining the ability to print one’s own currency gives governments a ﬂexible way to raise
revenue. Emerging markets economies are typically subject to big shocks, and large fractions of
government revenue are linked to volatile commodity prices. Moreover, increasing traditional
tax rates is diﬃcult, and does not guarantee additional revenue when evasion is widespread and
the informal sector is large. In this context seigniorage is a valuable ﬁscal instrument, since extra
money can rapidly be printed as required. Click (1998) documents that seigniorage accounted
for a large share of government spending in many Latin American countries in the 1970s and
1980s and that countries with more volatile spending relied more heavily on seigniorage as a
ﬁscal instrument. Calvo and Guidotti (1993) ﬁnd that inﬂation taxes tend to be much more
volatile than regular taxes in practice. They rationalize this ﬁnding by developing a model in
which it is optimal to let changes in the inﬂation tax do all the work in adjusting to unanticipated
ﬂuctuations in spending.2
At the same time, emerging markets economies issue debt on international markets to smooth
ﬂuctuations and to ease temporary liquidity problems. In the model developed in this paper,
dollarization may help strengthen fragile sovereign debt markets. The logic is that because
dollarizing rules out the use of monetary policy to respond to shocks, it may increase the value
1Dollarization is meant in the broad sense of unilaterally adopting a stronger foreign currency such as the
U.S. dollar, euro, or yen.
2Canzoneri and Rogers (1990) explore the importance of seigniorage in the European Union. They ﬁnd that
the optimal inﬂation rate is country-speciﬁc and depends on the eﬃciency of the domestic tax collection system.
2to the sovereign of maintaining access to the debt instrument. Thus if default is punished
by exclusion from debt markets, dollarization eﬀectively reduces the sovereign’s incentive to
default, and thereby increases the amount of borrowing that can be supported in equilibrium.
Our theoretical model is a small open exchange economy designed to highlight the trade-
oﬀ that arises in the decision to dollarize between the loss of seigniorage as a ﬂexible ﬁscal
instrument on the one hand, and the potential gain from increased ﬁnancial integration on the
other. Consumers value private and public consumption goods. To ensure a role for two policy
instruments, the growth rate of money and international debt, we assume the economy is subject
to two sources of risk. First, output is stochastic, which introduces a motive for inter-temporal
smoothing. Second, consumers’ relative taste for private versus public consumption ﬂuctuates,
which introduces a motive for intra-temporal reallocation between the private and public sector.
In the tradition of the literature on optimal policy, we assume that the government is benev-
olent and rational, and seeks to maximize the utility of a representative consumer.3 Changes
in the money growth rate aﬀect the division of output between consumers and the government
because of a cash-in-advance friction. In addition to revenue from seigniorage, the govern-
ment also trades one period bonds in international ﬁnancial markets at a constant real interest
rate. However, the government cannot commit to repay international debts: contracts must be
self-enforcing as in Zhang (1997). Thus foreign creditors set borrowing limits such that the gov-
ernment always has the incentive to honor its obligations, where the penalty in case of default
is permanent ﬁnancial autarky.
We compare a ﬂoating exchange rate regime to a dollarized regime. Under ﬂoating, the
government sets the money growth rate and thus the inﬂation and devaluation rates at every
date. Under dollarization, the inﬂation rate is constant, and the government’s only policy
instrument is its international debt position.
After deﬁning the Ramsey problem for the government, we explore what determines how
much international borrowing can be supported in equilibrium, and how this varies across
exchange rate regimes. In an extensive sensitivity analysis we ﬁnd that dollarizing can either
increase or reduce the amount of borrowing that can be supported in equilibrium. Relative to a
ﬂoat, borrowing constraints tend to be looser under a dollarized regime (i) the larger are shocks
to the relative taste for public versus private consumption, (ii) the less synchronized are periods
of high output (and tax revenue) and high demand for government consumption, (iii) the lower
is the interest rate, and (iv) the higher is the rate of time preference. In the ﬂoating economy,
the process for demand shocks has no impact on the position of the borrowing constraint, since
these shocks can always be perfectly smoothed with monetary policy. Comparing welfare across
regimes, we ﬁnd that dollarizing is welfare-improving in regions of the parameter space where
dollarizing supports suﬃcient additional borrowing to oﬀset the welfare loss associated with
3See, for example, Lucas and Stokey (1983) and Chari and Kehoe (1999). Most of the literature on Ramsey
optimal taxation has been developed for closed economies.
3losing control of the rates of money growth, inﬂation and devaluation.
Finally, to get a sense of the quantitative relevance of the trade-oﬀ we explore, we consider a
calibration to El Salvador (which dollarized in 2001) and to Mexico (which has been discussed
as a potential candidate for dollarization). We ﬁnd that in both cases large taste shocks are
required to account for the high volatility of government spending relative to GDP. The model
successfully replicates some key features of the data, such as the co-movement at business cycle
frequencies between government consumption on the one hand, and output, private consump-
tion, the inﬂation rate, and the change in the government’s net foreign asset position on the
other.
Comparing across the two regimes, we ﬁnd that in the calibration to El Salvador the dol-
larized economy exhibits looser borrowing constraints and less frequent debt crises, identiﬁed
as periods in which the borrowing constraint is binding. At the maximum value for debt that
can be sustained in the ﬂoating regime, lifetime utility can be higher when dollarized, reﬂecting
the beneﬁt of a looser borrowing constraint. The results for the Mexico calibration are quite
diﬀerent: in this case, less borrowing can be supported in the dollarized economy. We interpret
the diﬀerent results for these two countries in terms of diﬀerences in the covariance matrix for
the underlying shocks.
In Section 2 of the paper we describe a range of empirical evidence consistent with our thesis
that reducing devaluation risk might also reduce default risk. We focus in particular on Ecuador,
El Salvador, and countries that adopted the euro, and argue that for these countries abandoning
an independent monetary policy has led to a reduction in ﬁnancial markets’ perceptions of
default risk.
There is a large literature on the pros and cons of dollarization, and an even larger related
literature on the relative merits of ﬁxed versus ﬂoating exchange rates. Perhaps the two most
discussed arguments in favor of dollarization are that it can reduce inﬂation by importing
monetary policy credibility, and can increase trade by eliminating currency risk and foreign
exchange transaction costs (Alesina and Barro 2002). The model we develop in this paper is
deliberately designed to abstract from these potential beneﬁts in order to clarify the trade-oﬀ in
the dollarization decision between the loss of seigniorage as a ﬂexible ﬁscal instrument on the one
hand, and the potential increase in international ﬁnancial integration on the other. However,
because additional mechanisms would come into play in a richer model, we now brieﬂyr e v i e w
the existing debate, and explain how it connects to the theory developed in this paper.
The evidence on the boost to trade from eliminating currency risk is mixed. Frankel and
Rose (2002) ﬁnd that currency unions boost bilateral trade signiﬁcantly with other currency
union countries in a sample of 186 countries. However, Lane (2006) notes that to date the
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in Europe has not increased the importance of intra-
euro-zone trade relative to trade outside the euro area. In contrast, there is strong evidence
that the EMU has increased ﬁnancial integration across the euro area along many dimensions,
4in particular by reducing bond spreads across member countries.
Dollarization does bring lower and less volatile inﬂation to countries adopting a stronger
currency (Edwards 2001). A common interpretation of the high and volatile inﬂation rates
in some emerging markets economies is that these countries face more severe time-consistency
problems in setting monetary policy than countries whose currencies are being adopted (see, for
example, Cooper and Kempf 2001). A competing explanation for why monetary independence
leads to higher inﬂation is that countries perceive control of the printing press as an opportunity
for beggar-thy-neighbor policy. Cooper and Kempf (2003) build a model in which inﬂation acts
as a tax on foreigners wishing to purchase domestic goods, prompting competitive governments
to choose ineﬃciently high inﬂation rates in equilibrium. Similarly, Cooley and Quadrini (2001)
argue that Mexico may prefer a higher inﬂation rate than the US because higher nominal interest
rates can have favorable eﬀects on the terms of trade. In the model of this paper, there is no
time consistency problem in monetary policy, and international prices are taken as given. Thus
the key diﬀerence between the ﬂoating and dollarized economies is the volatility of the inﬂation
rate, rather than the average level of inﬂation.
If dollarization is permanent, it eliminates the possibility of currency crises. Mendoza (2001)
argues that eliminating distortionary uncertainty over the duration of stabilization policies can
deliver substantial welfare gains (see also Calvo 1999 and Berg and Borensztein 2000). Dollar-
ization also solves the “fear of ﬂoating” problem (Calvo 2001) which arises when international
liabilities are denominated in dollars and currency devaluations therefore precipitate debt crises.
In our endowment economy, devaluations are non-distortionary. Furthermore, the law of one
price holds, so periods of inﬂation and devaluation do not make it more diﬃcult to repay dollar
debts.
Finally, Sims (2001) argues that dollarization is costly because it prevents the economy
from issuing (state-contingent) nominal debt, without aﬀecting dollar interest rates. However,
governments in emerging markets are largely unable to issue external debt in their own currency,
no matter what exchange rate regime they have, so it is not clear that this constitutes a strong
argument against dollarization in practice.
2 Historical Experience
In the context of our theory, a country’s choice for its exchange rate regime has implications for
the volatility of its inﬂation rate, and for its ability to sell bonds in international sovereign debt
markets. In practice, easier access to international credit should translate into some combination
of additional borrowing or lower sovereign risk spreads. In this section we provide some empirical
evidence that is consistent with the hypothesis that by surrendering monetary independence a
government can eﬀectively improve its credit rating as a sovereign borrower.
We ﬁrst look at the experiences of four countries that recently delegated monetary policy
5oﬀshore: Italy and Portugal, which adopted the European single currency in 1999, and Ecuador
and El Salvador, which dollarized in 2000 and 2001 respectively. Figure 1 plots time series for
sovereign spreads for loans issued by these four countries.4 Spreads are deﬁned as the diﬀerence
in yields between domestic and foreign government issued bonds, where paired bonds share
similar maturities, coupon rates and currency. In each case, we are able to isolate default risk
from devaluation risk by pairing bonds denominated in the same currency. For example, we
compare the yield to maturity on a deutsche mark (DM) denominated bond issued by Italy to
a DM denominated bond issued by Germany.
Italy and Portugal are interesting case studies among the set of European countries par-
ticipating in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) because in addition to having issued
foreign currency bonds that are traded in secondary markets, they have lived with very high
levels of government debt relative to GDP: 116% and 95% respectively in 1996. The European
single currency was oﬃcially introduced on January 1st 1999, but more relevant for markets’
perceptions of default risk is the date when it became clear that these countries would be al-
lowed to adopt the euro at the new currency’s inception. For Italy, Bassetto (2006) argues that
1996 was the key year. The ﬁrst panel of Figure 1 s h o w st h a ts p r e a d so nI t a l i a nd e u t s c h em a r k
denominated bonds decreased substantially in that year, by about 100 basis points in total. The
second panel plots spreads for Portuguese bonds. As in the Italian case, spreads on these bonds
also decreased signiﬁcantly in 1996 and 1997.5
Ecuador dollarized in 2000 in the midst of a severe economic crisis with a collapsing banking
system, a sliding local currency, and after defaulting on its Brady bonds in late 1999. The
regime was implemented in an attempt to reduce inﬂation, bring stability to the economy, and
gain credibility with international investors. Since dollarization, Ecuador’s inﬂation has been
signiﬁcantly reduced to single digits. Figure 1 shows that default risk increased signiﬁcantly in
1998 prior to the 1999 crisis and default. In July 2000 spreads came down again after Ecuador
dollarized and renegotiated its debts. Since the dollarization plan was implemented, spreads on
Ecuadorian government bonds have decreased cumulatively by about 800 basis points.
El Salvador implemented its dollarization plan in 2001. Figure 1 shows that the spread on
dollar loans has decreased by over 400 basis points since 2001. In fact the very day after the
new currency was adopted, the interest rate on con s u m e rm o r t g a g e sf e l lf r o m1 7t o1 1p e r c e n t .
Consumer credit has been growing, and the government and the corporate sector have beneﬁted
4Data for Italy and Portugal are from Bloomberg. Italian bonds are matured in 12-31-97 and 12-31-06
respectively. The Portuguese bond matured 7-02-03. We do not report spreads when the time to maturity
drops below one year. Ecuador’s spread is the JP Morgan Emerging Market Bond Index (EMBI) Spread for
Ecuador. Data for El Salvador are the diﬀerence between the domestic dollar prime interest rate on loans of
maturity greater than one year and the yield on a U.S. government bill with one year maturity. We use this
spread measure for El Salvador because El Salvador issued its ﬁrst Global Bonds in international markets only
in 2001.
5Bernoth, von Hagen and Schuknecht (2006) document that spreads on newly issued DM-denominated bonds











































































Figure 1: Spreads and Dollarization
from cheaper international borrowing.
Table 1. Correlations with International Investor Ratings
Inﬂation St.Dev Inﬂation Fixed Exch. Rate Debt / GDP log(GDP/capita)
-0.46 -0.43 0.29 -0.31 0.89
Thus, in time series data for countries that have surrendered monetary policy, there is
evidence that this reform has reduced the cost of international credit. We now turn to cross-
sectional data, and consider a much larger set of countries. Here we ﬁnd complementary evidence
that countries with less ﬂexibility in setting monetary policy - as evidenced by having a ﬁxed
exchange rate or less volatile inﬂation - are viewed as safer borrowers.
We study the relationship between inﬂation, the exchange rate regime, and default risk for
the 76 countries that are rated by Moody’s for its International Investor Ratings. These credit
ratings are intended to convey default risk for foreign currency sovereign bonds. We use credit
ratings as opposed to direct measures of spreads as our proxy for ease of access to international
credit because ratings are available for a broader set of countries (in practice, ratings and
spreads correlate very strongly). For each country in our sample, the statistics we record are (1)
7Moody’s ratings for 2000 converted to a linear scale (higher numbers equate to better ratings),
(2) CPI inﬂation in 2000, (3) the standard deviation of CPI inﬂation over the period 1985-2000,
(4) GDP per capita in dollars in 2000, (5) a dummy variable corresponding to a ﬁxed exchange
rate regime in 2000, and (6) the ratio of foreign debt to GDP in 2001.6
Table 1 shows the correlations of credit ratings for government debt with these other vari-
ables. Ratings tend to be better for countries with low and stable inﬂation, low levels of foreign
debt to GDP, ﬁxed exchange rate regimes, and higher GDP per capita. These correlations are
consistent with the notion that too much ﬂexibility in monetary policy can crowd out ﬂexibility
in debt policy. Still, one should not over-interpret this evidence, for at least two reasons. First,
nominally ﬁxed exchange rate regimes vary enormously in how frequently and easily exchange
rate parities can be adjusted, while our theory will strictly apply only to very hard pegs. Sec-
o n d ,t h ee x c h a n g er a t er e g i m ei sap o l i c yc h o i c et h a tl i k e l yc o r r e l a t e sw i t hi n s t i t u t i o n a lf a c t o r s
that also impact credibility in ﬁnancial markets. Thus, to properly understand the relationship
between dollarization and ﬁnancial integration, we need an explicit model.
3M o d e l
We consider a small open economy populated by a large number of identical consumers, a
representative ﬁrm, and a government. Consumers work for ﬁr m s ,a n de a c hp e r i o dp r o d u c ea
stochastic quantity of goods that can be used for private or public consumption. Firms sell
these goods in exchange for cash. Once the goods market has closed, ﬁrms pay their workers.
Thus the cash that consumers spend on goods in the current period must be carried over from
t h ep r e v i o u sp e r i o d .
The government is benevolent and chooses policies to maximize consumer welfare. We
compare two alternative exchange rate regimes. The ﬁrst is a simple ﬂoat. Under a ﬂoat, trade
in the cash goods market is conducted using the currency issued by the domestic government,
which we label the peso. We allow the government to print new money after observing the
ﬁrm’s output and to spend it immediately to purchase goods that will be provided publicly.
The second regime we consider is dollarization. Only foreign currency circulates in a dollarized
economy. Thus the domestic government has no control over monetary policy and enjoys no
seigniorage.
We assume that under both regimes, the government is the only actor in the economy with
6The series for GDP per capita and inﬂation (2, 3 and 4) are from the World Bank’s World Development
Indicators. The exchange rate dummy (5) is from a classiﬁcation by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003). The
dummy variable takes the value of 1 for countries with ﬁxed exchange rates. It takes the value of 0 if the regime
is “Flexible" or “Interim" in their classiﬁcation. The ratio of foreign debt to GDP (6) is from the World Bank
Statistics on External Debt and the Central Government Debt Statistical Yearbook. We use debt data for 2001
due to limited data availability for 2000. For the developed countries that are not present in the World Bank
Statistics on External Debt, we use central government foreign debt, estimated as the percentage of marketable
debt held by non-residents times total central government debt.
8access to a competitive international bond market.7 In the bond market the domestic govern-
ment can sell bonds that take the form of one-period dollar-denominated loans. International
lenders decide whether to lend, how much to lend, and at what price to lend. However they can-
not make the price of loans contingent on the borrowing government’s net foreign asset position,
or on the shocks that will hit the economy in the next period. Thus asset markets are far from
complete. However, the assumed market structure is appropriate for most emerging markets
economies, whose bonds typically specify repayment in foreign currency and on non-contingent
terms.8
International debt contracts are notoriously diﬃcult to enforce directly. We assume that
lenders can commit to honor their contractual obligations, but that the domestic government
cannot commit to repay any debt obligations. In the event of default, creditors are assumed to
credibly punish the government by permanently excluding it from the bond market: a govern-
ment that has defaulted in the past can neither buy nor sell bonds. When it is impossible to
impose direct sanctions on defaulting sovereigns, this is the harshest feasible punishment.9
We assume that international lenders can earn a safe real return r on the world market.
Competition among lenders combined with the assumption that lending rates must be non-
contingent drives all lenders to sell bonds at the same price 1/(1+r) and to ensure repayment by
rationing credit.10 Thus lenders impose endogenous borrowing limits on the sovereign such that
no borrowing occurs beyond the point at which the probability of subsequent default becomes
positive. A key point of the paper is that because default incentives depend on the menu of
policy instruments available to the government, the position of these endogenous borrowing
constraints will generally diﬀer across the ﬂoating and dollarized regimes.
We now lay out the model formally and describe in detail the problems solved by each agent
in our economy.
In each period t =0 ,1,... the economy experiences one of ﬁnitely-many events st ∈ S. An
event is a stochastic realization for output, yt, and a stochastic realization for a preference
parameter λt. We assume that the pair of shocks st =( yt,λ t) evolves according to a ﬁrst-order
7In reality, non-government international trade in ﬁnancial assets is growing, but it is still the case that most
external debt in countries where dollarization is considered a possibility represents government borrowing. For
example, as of March 2003, Argentinean government debt accounted for 67% of the total stock of foreign debt;
in Mexico and Ecuador the corresponding ﬁgures were 56% and 73%.
8The diﬃculty emerging-markets face in borrowing abroad in their own currencies is referred to as “original
sin." See Chapter 1 of Eichengreen and Hausmann (2005) for empirical evidence on the currency denomination
of sovereign debt.
9Permanent exclusion from trade might sound counter-factually harsh. However, since default is not an
equilibrium outcome, what matters for observed allocations is the value of the threatened punishment, and not
precisely how it is implemented. Kletzer and Wright (2000) develop a model of sovereign debt in which the
eﬀective punishment for default is equivalent to permanent autarky, but where the punishment is delivered in a
way that permits trade to continue, but on worse terms from the borrower’s perspective.
10One could imagine an alternative market structure in which lenders oﬀer a menu of contracts, each of which
speciﬁes a loan amount and an interest rate. Contracts for greater loan amounts would then be associated with
higher interest rates to compensate for greater risk of default. In equilibrium the unconditional expected return
to the lender would be equalized across contracts. This market structure is adopted in Arellano (2005).
9Markov process. We denote by st =( s0,...st) ∈ St the history of events up to and including
period t. The probability, as of date 0, of a particular history st is φ(st).
Output y(st) is produced by the representative ﬁrm and can be converted into a private
consumption good c(st) or a public consumption good, g(st). Output is produced at the start of
the period, and then allocated between consumers and the government in a cash market in the
middle of the period. At the end of the period, ﬁrms pay their workers (consumers) nominal
wages w(st).
Consumers are inﬁnitely-lived, discount at rate β, and derive utility from both privately and



















t) and 0 <λ (s
t) < 1.
V a r i a t i o ni nt h et a s t ep a r a m e t e rλ(st) can be interpreted as capturing changes through time
in household preferences for public versus private goods, or changes in the taste for the allocation
mechanism (government provision versus market provision). One possible manifestation of these
changes in taste would be electoral cycles in which populist free-spending governments and more
ﬁscally conservative market-oriented governments take turns in power. In the context of the
model, these shocks play two roles. First, a second source of uncertainty introduces a clear role
for a second policy instrument, and suggests a downside to renouncing the monetary instrument
by dollarizing. Second, when we later calibrate the model to El Salvador and Mexico, we ﬁnd
that demand-side shocks of some sort are required to account for the high volatility of private
and public consumption in the data.
We assume that cash is the only savings vehicle available to consumers. The representative
consumer enters the period with money savings from the previous period ms(st−1) and wages
from the previous period w(st−1). He observes the endowment shock y(st), the taste shock λ(st),
and the price level P(st). He then decides how much of his money to spend, subject to the














where m(st−1) denotes total nominal balances carried into period t. In the ﬂoating economy
consumers can only save and purchase goods using pesos.11 Note that we do not assume at the
11Later we will argue that in equilibrium consumers in the ﬂexible economy would not want to save in the
10outset that shocks are small enough to rule out money saving because the variance of shocks is
an important determinant of the position of borrowing constraints. In fact, for realistic amounts
of volatility, we will ﬁnd that money saving typically does occur in equilibrium.
The household problem is to choose sequences for money savings ms(st) and consumption
c(st) to maximize expected lifetime utility (eq. 1) subject to the cash-in-advance constraint (eq.
2), the budget constraint (eq. 3) and a non-negativity constraint on consumption, c(st) ≥ 0,
taking as a given a complete set of date and state contingent endowments y(st), taste shocks
λ(st), wages w(st), prices P(st), probabilities φ(st), and initial money holdings m−1.
















where π(st,s t+1)=P(st,s t+1)/P(st) denotes the gross inﬂation rate when next period’s state
is st+1.












3.1 Government Problem When Floating
At time zero, the government in the ﬂoating regime decides on a policy Λ = {g(st),B(st),M(st)}
which deﬁnes government consumption g(st), dollar-denominated assets B(st), and the quantity
of pesos in circulation M(st) for all t ≥ 0 and for all st given some initial assets B−1 and nominal
balances M−1.
The government is not subject to a cash-in-advance constraint since it can print new money
after observing y(st) and λ(st) and use this money immediately to help ﬁnance public consump-
tion, g(st). Let M(st)=M(st−1)+N(st) denote the aggregate stock of money in circulation at









In addition to seigniorage and revenue from international borrowing, the government also
seizes a constant fraction τ of the endowment directly, with no money changing hands. This
can be interpreted as a constant tax rate on private-sector output or, alternatively, as the
government producing fraction τ of output. We assume the law of one price holds, so that the
nominal exchange rate measured in units of pesos per dollar is equal to the domestic price level:
form of dollars, even if they were allowed to do so.











where B(st) are dollar-denominated riskless foreign assets purchased at st.




The government is allowed to default at any date. If the government chooses to default,







However, as noted above, lenders will not lend beyond the point at which the default prob-
ability becomes positive. We assume that the constraints B(st) are tight enough to deter the
government from ever defaulting in equilibrium, but “not too tight” in the sense of Alvarez
and Jermann (2000). In particular, constraints would be too tight if it were possible to loosen
the constraint marginally for at least one st without this change ever inducing a borrowing-
constrained agent to default.
3.2 Government Problem When Dollarized
The problem for the government in a dollarized economy diﬀers from the one described above
in two respects.
First, the money growth rate is not a domestic policy instrument but is chosen by the foreign
government to maintain a constant price level which we normalize to one. We assume that the
domestic dollar cash market for goods is open to foreigners as well as domestic consumers. Thus
arbitrage equates the domestic price level to the foreign one: P(st)=P∗(st)=1 . Given that
the domestic government cannot print new money, the term N(st) drops out of the government






Second, as we have already emphasized, the maximum amount of borrowing allowed at a
point in time, B(st), will diﬀer across regimes. In particular, suppose debt is used more actively
under dollarization to compensate for the lack of a monetary instrument. Then the prospect of
losing the debt instrument in the event of default should be of greater concern in the dollarized
regime, and it may therefore be possible to support more sovereign debt in equilibrium.
123.3 Equilibrium Relationships
The following relationships apply to both economies.











In the ﬂoating regime, N(st) denotes the domestic government’s newly printed money, while in
the dollarized economy, N(st) denotes dollar net purchases of domestically-produced goods by
foreigners.12












Note that if households do no money saving (ms(st)=0 )we get the standard quantity equation
with velocity equal to one. Initial money holdings equal the initial money supply m−1 = M−1















These conditions can be interpreted as follows. Under a ﬂoat, all international borrowing and
lending is conducted by the government, and thus the change in the government’s bond position
is the only item on the capital account. In the dollarized economy, there is an additional private
source of capital ﬂows associated with changes in the quantity of dollars circulating domestically,
N(st). For domestic households, dollar bills can be viewed as international bonds that can be
used to smooth shocks to wages and preferences. However, their value as a self-insurance
device is limited by two factors: (i) they pay zero real interest, and (ii) dollar holdings are
bounded below by the cash-in-advance constraint: the household must always carry at least
12Negative N(st) can be interpreted as follows. Under a ﬂoat the domestic government is borrowing goods
abroad, selling them on the domestic market, and taking the domestic money it receives in exchange out of
circulation. Under dollarization, domestic consumers are buying goods from abroad.
13w(st−1)=( 1− τ)y(st−1) dollars from period t − 1 into period t.
For each regime, combining the government budget constraint and the aggregate resource














For solving the equilibrium allocations in the ﬂoating economy it is convenient to express private
consumption and the real money variables in terms of the sequences y(st),μ (st) and x(st), with
no reference to nominal variables M(st),P(st) or N(st).



















Note that if the household is not doing any money saving (x(st)=0 ), then c(st)=( 1−
τ)y(st)/μ(st). However in general, the money growth rate has a direct eﬀect on consumption
a n da ni n d i r e c te ﬀect via x(st).13















In the dollarized regime π(st)=1for all st and thus the money growth rate μ(st) is endoge-
nous and depends in equilibrium on households’ choices regarding money savings x(st). In the
ﬂoating economy the money growth rate μ(st) is the domestic government’s policy choice and
the inﬂation rate π(st) is endogenous and depends on money savings x(st).
Making repeated use of the expression for the price level, eq. 16, real balances, real money
savings, and the real value of seigniorage (corresponding to net purchases by foreigners in the
13The direct eﬀect is that faster money growth reduces purchasing power and reduces consumption. The
indirect eﬀect is that faster money growth reduces the savings rate x(st) (we show this in the appendix) which
from eq. 17 increases consumption, as long as μ(st) > 1.































Note that x(st) ∈ [0,1]. Setting μ(st)=1implies zero seigniorage. As μ(st) →∞ ,
N(st)
P(st) →
(1 − τ)y(st) and thus c(st) → 0. Note that for μ(st) ≥ 1 seigniorage is (weakly) positive. For
μ(st) < 1, seigniorage is negative.
4D e ﬁnition of Equilibrium
We ﬁrst deﬁne equilibria for two economies that are not of direct interest, but that are useful for
constructing borrowing constraints that are not too tight. The ﬁrst economy is one in which:
(i) the borrowing constraints {B(st)} are exogenous, and (ii) the government must respect the
constraints and is not allowed to default. The second economy is one in which the government
has defaulted in the past and has no access to the international debt market. The third economy,
which is the economy of interest, features endogenous borrowing constraints that are not too
tight. In this economy default is permitted but never occurs in equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 1 Equilibrium with exogenous borrowing constraints. Consider a set of con-




∀t ≥ 0 and for all st. A competitive equilibrium given initial assets B−1
and M−1 is a policy Λ, and an associated allocation rule mapping policies into prices P(Λ) and
w(Λ) and private choices c(Λ) and ms(Λ) such that for all t and st : (i) the household choices
solve the household’s problem, (ii) the government budget constraints are satisﬁed given initial
assets B−1 and the constraints e B, (iii) markets clear (eqs. 10 through 12).
Deﬁnition 2 Post-default equilibrium. A post default equilibrium is deﬁned in exactly the
same way, except that feasibility for the government requires B(st)=0 .
Deﬁnition 3 Ramsey problem. The Ramsey problem is to choose a policy Λ that maximizes
expected lifetime utility given assets B−1 and M−1 under the associated competitive equilibrium.
The Ramsey equilibrium is the solution to the Ramsey problem.
We will look for borrowing constraints that are tight enough, but not too tight. They are
tight enough in that if the sovereign is at the borrowing constraint, then the probability that
15he will strictly prefer to default in the next period is zero. They are not too tight in that there
is at least one combination of shocks under which he will be indiﬀerent between repaying or
defaulting. To formalize the diﬀerence between the values of repaying debts and defaulting, we
i n t r o d u c es o m en e wn o t a t i o n .
Let Wt+1(b,(m),(st,s t+1); e B) be a function deﬁning the value associated with a date t +1
Ramsey problem given history (st,s t+1), arbitrary bonds b (and in the dollarized economy
money m), and a set of borrowing constraints B. Let Dt+1(b,(st,s t+1); e B)) be a function







; e B)) = Wt+1(b,(m),(s





We now note some useful properties of these functions:
1. The function Wt+1(b,(m),(st,s t+1); e B) is strictly increasing in b for any (st,s t+1) while the
value of default is independent of the quantity of debt defaulted on. It follows immediately
that if for some history st the government weakly prefers not to default in every possible
st+1 given bonds b, then the government will strictly prefer to repay for any b0 >b .
Conversely, if the government is indiﬀerent about default for some b given st+1, then if
b0 <band st+1 is realized, the government will strictly prefer to default.
2. The function Dt+1(b,(st,s t+1); e B)) does not depend on the stock of money balances
consumers carry into the start of the period. In the ﬂoating economy the nominal quantity
o fp e s o si si r r e l e v a n t ,s i n c ei th a sn oi m p a c to nr e a la l l o c a t i o n s( w er e t u r nt ot h i sp o i n ti n
Proposition 1). In the dollarized economy, the Ramsey planner is powerless to impact the
time series for private consumption, and we have assumed separability in utility between
private and public consumption. Thus the diﬀerence between the values of repaying and
defaulting does not depend on cash balances.
3. Under the solution to the date 0 Ramsey problem, the continuation value at (st,s t+1) given
equilibrium bonds B(st) is equal to Wt+1(B(st),(M(st)),(st,s t+1); e B).T h i sr e ﬂects the
fact that there is no time consistency problem in these economies, a point we will return
to later.
Deﬁnition 4 Borrowing constraints that are not too tight. A set of borrowing constraints










If the not-too-tight condition is satisﬁed then by virtue of properties (1) and (2) B(st) ≥
B(st) ⇒ Wt+1(B(st),(M(st)),(st,s t+1);B) ≥ Vt+1 ((M(st)),(st,s t+1)). From property (3),
16Wt+1(B(st),(M(st)),(st,s t+1);B) is equal to the continuation value at st under the original
date 0 Ramsey problem. Thus the not-too-tight condition (22) guarantees that the values
associated with the solution to the date 0 Ramsey problem are suﬃc i e n tt oe n s u r et h a tt h e
sovereign will never strictly prefer to default.
Deﬁnition 5 Monetary equilibrium with competitive riskless lending. This is deﬁned
in exactly the same way as the economy with exogenous borrowing constraints, except that (i)
the borrowing constraints are deﬁned by the solution to eq. 22 (i.e. they are not too tight), and
(ii) at each t and st the government has the option of defaulting.
Note that if all lenders but one were in aggregate willing to lend an amount strictly less
than B(st) given st, then the last lender could make a positive proﬁt on a marginal additional
loan by charging a real interest rate greater than r and bearing no default risk. Thus the only
equilibrium in the lending market in which no excess proﬁts remain is one in which lenders are
willing in aggregate to lend up to B(st) at the safe world interest rate r.
In the appendix we show that for a given feasible policy there is a unique monetary equilib-
rium in this economy.
4.1 Ramsey Equilibria
We now describe how we solve for the Ramsey equilibrium in our economies. Solving the Ramsey
problem in the dollarized economy is simpler, because monetary policy in this case is exogenous,
and the planner only needs to decide on the optimal debt policy.
4.1.1 Dollarized Economy
The Ramsey equilibrium in the dollarized monetary economy with riskless lending can be charac-
terized by solving the following planner’s problem. Consider a planner who maximizes expected






and a set of borrowing constraints of the form eq. 7.






























17Note that in the dollarized economy, separability between private and public consumption
in preferences implies that consumers and the government end up solving completely separate
problems. Consumers use dollar money savings to smooth the marginal utility of private con-
sumption through time, taking as given inﬂation rates. The government uses debt to smooth
the marginal utility of public consumption through time, taking as given the world interest rate
and state-contingent borrowing constraints.
4.1.2 Floating Economy
Proposition 1. The Ramsey equilibrium in the ﬂoating monetary economy with riskless lending
can be characterized by solving the problem of a planner who maximizes expected lifetime utility
eq. (1) subject to an aggregate resource constraint (13) and a set of borrowing constraints of the
form eq. (7) where these constraints are "not too tight."
Proof: See the appendix.
This result greatly simpliﬁes the Ramsey problem because it eﬀectively eliminates the con-
straint that the allocations chosen by the Ramsey planner must constitute a competitive equi-
librium. At the simplest level, the intuition for the result is that control of the money growth
rate is equivalent to access to lump-sum taxation in this economy: by choosing money growth
rates appropriately, the government can achieve any possible division of total resources be-
tween private and public consumption. Since the government’s problem reduces to a standard
consumption-savings problem, there is no time-consistency problem in our economies, in the
sense that the government never has an incentive to deviate from its pre-announced policy.14
Suﬃcient conditions for a solution to this planner’s problem are the optimality conditions







which says that the planner wants to equate the marginal utilities of privately and publicly
provided goods at each date and state.






t)=( 1 − λ(s
t))R(s
t) (28)
14Potential deviations from the pre-announced policy would be to default on outstanding debts, or to deviate
from pre-announced debt or monetary policy. Default will reduce welfare, given borrowing constraints that are
not too tight. Deviating from pre-announced debt policy will reduce welfare, since the pre-announced policy
smooths the marginal utility of government consumption as eﬀectively as possible. Deviating from pre-announced
monetary policy will be welfare-reducing, because such a change can only alter the mix between private and







Note that because the marginal utilities of private and public consumption are equated state
by state, the inter-temporal ﬁrst order condition 24 can be expressed in terms of total resources
available for domestic consumption R(st):
φ(st)
R(st)






Thus in this case, the planner simply wants to smooth ﬂuctuations in the endowment through
time, irrespective of the process for taste shocks: a ﬂoating, credit-worthy government will
typically issue debt when the endowment is relatively low, and repay when the endowment is
high. Monetary policy will be used primarily to adjust the mix between private and public
consumption in response to taste shocks. When λ(st) is high, indicating a preference for private
consumption, the money growth rate μ(st) and thus seigniorage will be relatively low.
4.2 Questions
1. Could the government do better by internalizing the relationship between policy choices
and not-too-tight borrowing constraints in the ﬂoating regime?
In deﬁning the Ramsey problem, we assumed that the government took borrowing con-
straints as given. Taking as given borrowing constraints that are not-too-tight, the Ramsey
solution maximizes value. To increase value, an alternative policy would have to imply
looser borrowing constraints. However, we can argue that not-too-tight constraints can
only be tighter under alternative policies. First, note that changing policy prior to default
will not change default values Vt(st) under a ﬂoat. Second, since values inside the contract,
Wt(B(st),s t ; B), could only be lower under alternative policies, not-too-tight borrowing
constraints could only be tighter. A similar argument applies to the dollarized economy.
2. Would domestic consumers like to be able to buy dollars in the ﬂoating regime?
Suppose households in the ﬂoating economy were able to exchange pesos for dollars, and
buy or sell goods on an international market. We can argue that prior to default, dollars












However, combining 27 and 30 gives
λ(st)φ(st)
c(st)







19Comparing these two inequalities, it is clear that as long as r>0, households will never
want to save in the form of dollars. The intuition is that the government can save dollars
at a positive interest rate, while households c a no n l yh o l dd o l l a rc ash. Since they value
consumption in diﬀe r e n ts t a t e se q u a l l y ,i ti se ﬃcient for the government to conduct all
international borrowing and lending.15 In the event of default, households might want to
save in the form of dollars. Thus if allowed to do so, the value of default under a ﬂoat
would be increased, and consequently borrowing constraints would be tighter.
3. Is there a role for domestic debt in these economies?
In the ﬂoating economy, control over the money-growth rate by itself eﬀectively amounts
to having access to a state-contingent lump-sum tax. Thus domestic debt instruments,
whether peso or dollar denominated, would be superﬂuous. In the dollarized model econ-
omy, endowing the government with the ability to buy and sell dollar-denominated bonds
with domestic consumers would eﬀectively introduce a valuable new instrument for re-
allocating resources between the private and public sector. In many emerging markets,
domestic debt’s usefulness as a re-allocative policy instrument is limited by poorly devel-
oped ﬁnancial markets. By contrast, virtually the entire population is active in the cash
goods market, and thus subject to the inﬂation tax associated with growth in the money
supply.
5 Quantitative Analysis
5.1 Comparing debt constraints and welfare across regimes
Conditional on a particular exchange rate regime, the borrowing constraint is looser the more
valuable is access to the debt instrument prior to default, or, equivalently, the more painful is
the loss of the instrument post default. Comparing across regimes, the constraint tends to be
looser in the regime in which debt is used more actively, which in turn depends on the nature
of shocks hitting the economy.
It is instructive to consider two simple examples, in which only one type of shock is operative.
First, suppose there are only shocks to λ, t h er e l a t i v et a s t ef o rp u b l i cv e r s u sp r i v a t ec o n -
sumption. In this case the only goal for policy is to allocate constant output eﬃciently between
public and private consumption. Control of the money growth rate and thus the inﬂation rate
can achieve this perfectly. Thus, under a ﬂoat there is no incentive for the government to repay
any debts, and the borrowing constraint is at zero. Under dollarization, debt is a valuable
though imperfect instrument since it is the only way for the government to smooth through
15The government enjoys an additional advantage relative to private households: it can borrow, while private
households cannot hold negative quantities of dollar currency.
20taste shocks. Thus borrowing can be supported in this case.
Second, consider the case with only shocks to output y.U n d e r a ﬂoat, in response to a
transitory increase in output it is optimal to increase the money growth rate in order to tax
away some of the increase in private income via inﬂation. Debt is used aggressively, since debt
repayments must both oﬀset the increase in direct tax revenue and the increase in seigniorage
revenue. Activist debt policy translates into strong repayment incentives and a loose borrowing
constraint. Under dollarization, by contrast, debt is used less prior to default, and consequently
the borrowing constraint is tighter.
When both types of shocks are operational, the relative volatility and correlation of shocks
are key to understanding the relative position of borrowing constraints under the two regimes.
Ranking welfare across the two regimes is more complicated than ranking borrowing con-
straints. Even if dollarizing means looser constraints, the associated beneﬁts must be weighted
against the costs of losing monetary policy as an instrument. If the economy is subject to only
one source of risk, it is easy to see that a ﬂoat necessarily welfare dominates. With only taste
shocks, a ﬂoat achieves the eﬃcient allocation of resources across sectors and through time,
even though no borrowing is supported in equilibrium. With only endowment shocks, a ﬂoat
welfare dominates because more borrowing can be supported in equilibrium. We conclude that
a necessary condition for dollarization to be welfare-improving in our environment is that the
v a r i a n c eo fb o t ht y p e so fs h o c k si sp o s i t i v e .
5.2 Sensitivity
To understand how the choice of exchange rate regime impacts debt constraints and welfare, we
consider a simple baseline parameterization, and conduct an extensive sensitivity analysis with
respect to alternative parameter values. We assume that both shocks are drawn independently
from the same two-point distribution, with a mean of 0.85 and a standard deviation of 5 percent.
Thus λ,y ∈ {0.8075,0.8925}. We set the constant tax rate τ so that absent any shocks, eﬃcient
allocations could be achieved with constant debt and a constant money supply. Thus τ =
E [1 − λ]=0 .15. Finally we set the discount factor β to 0.96 and the interest rate r to 2
percent. By exploring variations on this particular parameter conﬁguration we will learn a lot
about the diﬀerences between the two exchange rate regimes. Later we will introduce more
discipline in the choice of parameter values by calibrating the model to some speciﬁc countries.
In this section we explore how borrowing constraints and welfare change as we vary (i) the
variance of the taste shock λ, (ii) the correlation between λ and y, (iii) the discount factor β,and
(iv) the interest rate r. Comparing borrowing constraints across regimes is easy, because in our
example the position of the constraint is independent of the current state.16 Comparing welfare
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Figure 2: Borrowing Constraints and Welfare
is more diﬃcult because expected lifetime utility is conditional on all the state variables in the
economy. Moreover, in addition to the values for shocks and for sovereign debt, there is one
additional endogenous state variable in the dollarized economy, namely domestic consumers’
holdings of dollars. We compare welfare by (i) setting sovereign debt in both regimes equal to
the value of the borrowing constraint in the ﬂoating economy (which almost always exceeds the
constraint under dollarization), (ii) setting the real value of dollars in the dollarized economy
equal to the real value of pesos in the ﬂoating economy, and (iii) taking an unconditional average
across lifetime utility under each possible conﬁguration of shocks. The welfare diﬀerence is
reported as percentage diﬀerence in lifetime aggregate consumption across regimes.
At the parameter conﬁguration described above, the borrowing constraint is extremely tight
under a ﬂoat, while the government can borrow almost twenty percent of GDP in the dollarized
economy. Welfare is very similar. The intuition for these ﬁndings will become clear in the
context of our sensitivity analysis.
225.2.1 Variance of λ
We ﬁrst vary the variance of λ, holding all other parameters constant. The ﬁrst panel in Figure
2 shows the impact on the position of the borrowing constraints as a fraction of mean output,
and relative welfare in the two economies.
First, note that the variance of λ plays no role in determining the position of the constraint
or debt dynamics in the ﬂoating economy. As discussed above, this is because shocks to λ
can be perfectly insured with the money growth instrument. In the dollarized economy, the
borrowing constraint is looser the larger are the taste shocks, since bigger shocks increase the
role for international borrowing and lending. When taste shocks are small enough, the ranking of
constraints across regimes switches. This is consistent with the previous result for the economy
with only endowment shocks.
How the welfare ranking across regimes changes with the variance of taste shocks is also
intuitive. Obviously, when taste shocks are very small, so that more borrowing is possible in the
ﬂoating regime, then a ﬂoat welfare dominates: dollarizing would mean losing an instrument,
with no credibility gain in ﬁnancial markets. For more volatile taste shocks, there is an inter-
esting trade-oﬀ.F i g u r e2 shows that when taste shocks are large enough, the welfare gain from
looser borrowing constraints in the dollarized economy more than oﬀsets the loss of seigniorage
as a policy instrument, and thus dollarizing is welfare-improving.
5.2.2 Correlation between y and λ
The second panel in Figure 2 shows the eﬀect of varying the correlation between endowment
and taste shocks. This correlation has no impact on the position of the borrowing constraint
in the ﬂoating economy for the reason discussed above: taste shocks are perfectly insured via
monetary policy.
In the dollarized economy, a positive correlation between the two shocks means that when
output (and tax revenue) is high, government consumption is not especially valued (and vice
versa). Thus the government would like to use debt aggressively, and the threat of losing the
debt instrument in the event of default is potent. Thus the higher is the shock’s correlation,
the looser is the endogenous borrowing constraint.
The fact that increasing the correlation of shocks loosens the borrowing constraint is one
reason why higher correlation makes dollarization relatively more attractive in welfare terms. A
second reason is that for higher correlations, the loss of the monetary policy instrument under
dollarization is less painful. The logic is that if y and λ co-move positively, then private income
tends to rise automatically in times when private consumption is highly valued. Thus increasing
corr(y,λ) reduces the role for monetary policy.
235.2.3 The discount factor β
The third panel in Figure 2 shows the eﬀect of varying β. As in standard repeated games,
the more impatient are consumers, the less eﬀective is the threatened default punishment of
exclusion from international borrowing. Thus borrowing constraints become tighter as β is
reduced. For suﬃciently low β, no borrowing can be supported in equilibrium. This threshold
β is much higher in the ﬂoating regime, reﬂe c t i n gt h ef a c tt h a ti nt h i sc a s em o n e t a r yp o l i c y
perfectly insures taste shocks, and endowment shocks are small. Borrowing can be supported
for a wider range of values for β in the dollarized economy, because in this regime debt has an
additional valuable role smoothing preference shocks. As β increases towards the discount rate,
1/(1 + r), the borrowing limit loosens substantially in the dollarized economy, such that when
β =0 .98 it is at 27.5% of GDP, compared to 18.1% when β =0 .96.
When no borrowing can be supported in either regime, ﬂoating clearly welfare-dominates,
since dollarizing means losing an instrument with no credibility gain in ﬁnancial markets. The
welfare gap between the two regimes narrows as β is increased over the range where the bor-
rowing constraint is becoming looser in the dollarized economy, but is still zero in the ﬂoating
economy. As the consumer’s rate of time preference approaches the interest rate, the position
of the borrowing constraint becomes increasingly irrelevant. The reason is that as the opportu-
nity time cost of holding bonds shrinks, the government is willing to hold an increasingly large
buﬀer stock of precautionary bonds, and consequently the borrowing constraint binds ever less
frequently. This is why for large enough values for β, the welfare ranking across regimes ﬂips
once more.
5.2.4 The interest rate r
In the last panel of Figure 2 we consider the eﬀect of varying the interest rate, r. The results are
rather striking. The position of the borrowing constraint is minimally sensitive to the interest
rate in the ﬂoating regime, while the constraint becomes extremely loose for low interest rates
in the dollarized economy. When r =0 .1%, the government can borrow up to three times GDP
at a risk-free interest rate.
To build some intuition for these results, ﬁrst suppose there were no shocks in these economies.
With a small but positive interest rate and no enforcement frictions, the government would
like to borrow heavily initially, and enjoy a downward-sloping proﬁle for consumption looking
forward. This simply reﬂects the standard relationship between the desired growth rate for
consumption and the diﬀerential between the rate of interest and the rate of time preference. If
this diﬀerential is large, moving from a ﬂat consumption proﬁle to the optimal one can generate
large welfare gains. But in a risk-free version of a model in which debt repayment cannot be
enforced directly, these gains can never be realized. The reason is simply that the position of
the borrowing constraint depends only on the borrower’s incentives to maintain a good credit
24rating ex post:t h eex ante potential gains from reallocating consumption inter-temporally are
i r r e l e v a n t . W ec o n c l u d et h a tw h e nt h ei n t e r e s tr a t ei sf a rb e l o wt h er a t eo ft i m ep r e f e r e n c e ,
there are large welfare costs associated with the lack of an enforcement mechanism.
Now consider introducing shocks. As we reduce the interest rate, default incentives change
in two ways. First, it becomes cheaper to pay interest on loans, and the incentive to default is
reduced. Second, the cost of engaging in precautionary savings is larger because having bond
holdings in excess of the borrowing constraint is expensive. In the limit, if the interest rate
is suﬃciently low relative to the rate of time preference, it is never optimal to move oﬀ the
constraint, and since there is no use for debt, there is no cost to defaulting.
In the ﬂoating regime, as we have argued previously, the only shocks relevant to debt repay-
ment incentives are endowment shocks. These shocks are quite small, so for suﬃciently low r
(holding constant β), it will rarely be worth doing any precautionary saving. Thus, even though
maintaining a good credit report is cheap (because r is low), there is not much incentive to do
s o .T h i si sw h yt h eb o r r o w i n gc o n s t r a i n tr e m a i n sv e r yt i g h ti nt h eﬂoating economy.
Under dollarization, by contrast, the government also wants to use debt to smooth preference
shocks. In this case debt is used more aggressively, and the punishment for default remains
signiﬁcant even for r =0 . Thus in this economy the eﬀect that debt repayment becomes cheaper
when r is reduced dominates, and the borrowing constraint becomes extremely loose as r → 0.
As r → 0, the welfare gains from dollarizing become quite substantial, reaching 5.7 percent
of consumption when r =0 .1%. These welfare gains are too large to be attributed solely to
improved smoothing of endowment shocks, since the endowment shocks are relatively small, and
Lucas’ (1987) expressions for the welfare costs of business cycles would suggest small welfare
gains to eliminating them. Rather, the bulk of the welfare gains in this example comes from
inter-temporal reallocation. Starting at the tight ﬂoating constraint, dollarizing allows the
government to raise government spending in the short run and to then gradually reduce spending
over time.
5.2.5 Relation to literature
There is now quite a large literature that explores this class of models with endogenous debt
constraints. While these models are intuitively appealing and can shed light on some features
of sovereign debt markets, several important features of the data remain hard to explain. One
is that observed debt levels drastically exceed the amount of borrowing that can typically be
supported in calibrated versions of these models. The usual ﬁx to this problem has been to
assume that default comes with additional negative consequences, in addition to exclusion from
future credit markets. For example, many papers assume that post default, the mean endowment
is permanently reduced by several percentage points.
The analysis above suggests an alternative resolution. In particular, as long as the variance of
25shocks is positive, then as r → 0 and β(1+r) → 1 the borrowing constraint becomes arbitrarily
loose. The intuition is simple: as r → 0, so does the cost of repaying debts. As β(1 + r) → 1
the cost of holding precautionary savings approaches zero, so that as long as the borrower faces
some risk, the borrower will want to self-insure with debt, and will wish to avoid the punishment
associated with default. Thus it is tempting to conclude that if the model is calibrated to a
suﬃciently short period length, one can support realistic debt levels in equilibrium. However,
validating this hypothesis requires a careful evaluation of the nature of high frequency risk that
is beyond the scope of this paper.
5.3 Calibration
We now apply our model to the study of actual countries in which dollarization has been
discussed or implemented. Given that the relative performance of the ﬂoating and dollarized
regimes in terms of ﬁnancial integration and welfare is very sensitive to various parameter
values, it is important to consider parameterizations that are appropriate for speciﬁc countries.
We calibrate to two countries: El Salvador, which dollarized in 2001, and Mexico, which retains
the peso, but where dollarization has been discussed in the past (see, for example, Cooley and
Quadrini, 2001). The strategy is to calibrate the model assuming a ﬂoating regime, and to then
compare across exchange rate regimes holding all parameter values constant.
We solve the model at a quarterly frequency and compare annualized output from the model
to the annual data that is available for these countries. The variables we focus on are real output,
government consumption, household consumption, the change in government net foreign assets,
and the inﬂation rate. The series for output, public and private consumption and inﬂation
are from the World Development Indicators for 1960-2002.17 Inﬂation is the annual percentage
change in consumer prices. To study the dynamics of foreign public debt in our model we use the
series for Government Foreign Financing as a percentage of GDP from the IMF’s International
Financial Statistics for 1980-2002. We log the series for output and consumption, and ﬁlter all
the data with a 15 year Band-Pass Filter.18
The stochastic structure for the shocks is country-speciﬁc. We assume that λ and y are drawn







17The speciﬁc series we used from WDI are: General government ﬁnal consumption expenditure, Household
ﬁnal consumption expenditure, GDP and Inﬂation. All these series (except inﬂation) are in per capita terms,
and in real units of local currency.
18We use a longer ﬁlter to keep some of the lower frequency movements that have been documented by Aguiar














The three parameters in the variance-covariance matrix Σ are chosen so that the ﬂoating
economy replicates the annualized volatilities of output and government consumption, and the
correlation between government consumption and output. Shocks are discretized into a 9-state
Markov process following the Hussey and Tauchen (1991) procedure.
The quarterly interest rate r is set to 1%, which is the average quarterly yield on a one-year
U.S. Treasury Bill for the period 1996 to 2006. The time preference parameter β is set to
0.98, which is consistent with the 2% average quarterly interest rate in El Salvador on domestic
dollar-denominated loans.19 For the sake of simplicity, we assume the same value for β in both
countries.
The mean value for λ is set to 0.85, so that the mean government consumption to GDP ratio
is 15%. This is approximately equal to the government consumption to output ratio in both
countries. As in the sensitivity section we assume a constant labor tax rate τ =0 .15. Table 2
summarizes the parameter values used.
Table 2: Calibration
Country-speciﬁc parameters Mexico El Salvador
std. dev. output σy 0.0787 0.105
std. dev. pref. shock σλ 0.013 0.035
shock correlation σyλ/σyσλ −0.524 0.372
Common parameters
mean pref. shock E [λ]0 .85
interest rate r 0.01
labor tax rate τ 0.15
discount factor β 0.98
5.4 El Salvador
Table 3 presents business cycle statistics for the El Salvadorean data, and for the corresponding
model economy under the ﬂoating and dollarized regimes. Business cycle statistics from the
model are based on annualized output from a long simulation designed to approximate the
limiting distribution of asset holdings. Model output is ﬁltered in the same way as the data.
In the data, government consumption is almost twice as volatile as output and private
consumption is substantially more volatile than output. In the context of our calibration proce-
dure, this generates an important role for taste shocks. Inﬂation and government consumption
19The series used is the prime lending rate in dollars for loans of more than one year, as reported by the El
Salvador Central Bank, for the post-dollarization period.
27co-move positively, and are both counter-cyclical. To replicate the counter-cyclicality of gov-
ernment consumption, the calibration calls for positively correlated shocks (see Table 2). The
change in net foreign public assets is acyclical and negatively correlated with government con-
sumption in the data. Thus periods of high government expenditure are associated with both
higher inﬂation and greater foreign borrowing.
Table 3: Business Cycle Statistics, EL SALVADOR
Data Floating Economy Dollarized Economy
σx ρx,y ρx,g σx ρx,y ρx,g σx ρx,y ρx,g
Output 5.27 — -0.05 5.27 — -0.05 5.27 — -0.05
Government cons. 9.73 -0.05 — 9.74 -0.05 — 8.30 -0.05 —
Private cons. 7.58 0.90 -0.38 4.68 0.81 -0.25 4.37 0.79 0.11
Inﬂation 4.46 -0.29 0.19 8.92 -0.22 0.68 — — —
∆ net foreign public assets 0.48 0.03 -0.19 3.11 0.67 -0.25 3.27 0.54 -0.84
Borrowing constraint / GDP (%) 7.01 8.31
Mean money savings / GDP (%) 0.80 1.20
Mean debt / GDP (%) 3.96 6.40
Frequency constraint binds (%) 10.0 6.0
The ﬂoating regime model calibrated to El Salvador ﬁts the data well. The model repli-
cates the negative empirical correlation between private and public consumption, the positive
correlation between inﬂation and government consumption, and the countercyclicality of inﬂa-
tion. Given the shock process, periods of low output - when inter-temporal smoothing dictates
additional foreign borrowing - also tend to be periods when the demand for government con-
sumption is high - and intra-temporal smoothing dictates high inﬂation. Thus the model is able
to replicate the fact that inﬂation is counter-cyclical, and the fact that the accumulation of net
foreign assets is negatively correlated with government consumption.
Table 3 also presents the statistics for the dollarized regime. Dollarization increases ﬁnancial
integration for El Salvador. The dollarized economy is able to borrow a larger proportion of
annual output (8.3 versus 7.0 percent in the ﬂoating regime) and debt is used more aggressively.
Dollarization also reduces the frequency of ﬁnancial crises, deﬁned as periods in which the
borrowing constraint is binding: the probability mass at the constraint is 10% under a ﬂoat
compared to 6% when dollarized. More active use of debt in the dollarized regime appears
to be a good substitute for the loss of the inﬂation instrument, as evidenced by the similar
volatility of government consumption across regimes. In the dollarized economy, the sovereign
wants to borrow when output is low or when the taste for government consumption is high.
Since these events tend to coincide in the El Salvador calibration, a single instrument can go
a long way towards accommodating both sources of risk. We ﬁnd that expected welfare under
28the dollarized regime is very similar to the ﬂoating regime. In light of the sensitivity analysis,
the reason why dollarization looks quite attractive is twofold: (i) taste shocks are large, and (ii)
taste and productivity shocks are positively correlated.
Average money savings - in excess of those dictated by the cash-in-advance constraint -
are quite small in these economies, on the order of one percent of annual GDP. Nonetheless,
adjustment of money savings is quite a powerful instrument for smoothing the marginal utility
of private consumption inter-temporally. One indication of the role played by money comes
from comparing the volatilities of output and private consumption in the dollarized economy.
In the absence of money saving, the consumer’s budget constraint would reduce to c(st)=
(1 − τ)y(st−1), in which case private consumption and output would be equally volatile. In
contrast, in the monetary equilibrium the percentage standard deviation of output is 5.27, while
the corresponding ﬁgure for private consumption is 4.37. Note also that on average there is more
demand for money when dollarized than under a ﬂoat. This does not reﬂect a diﬀerence in the
average inﬂation rate across regimes. Rather private consumers compensate for the absence of
monetary policy as a device for buﬀering shocks by engaging in additional precautionary saving
and self-insurance.
5.5 Mexico
Table 4 presents business cycle statistics for the data in Mexico and for the corresponding mod-
els. Consumption and output are roughly equally volatile in Mexican data, while government
consumption is much more volatile than output. Inﬂation has been extremely volatile. In terms
of correlations, the Mexican economy diﬀers dramatically from El Salvador’s. In Mexico, the
correlations between private consumption, public consumption and output are all strongly pos-
itive. In further contrast to El Salvador, the change in net foreign assets is positively correlated
with output and weakly positively correlated with government consumption. Thus the Mexican
government borrows in recessions, while booms in government spending are typically ﬁnanced
by inﬂa t i o no rg r o w t hi nt h et a xb a s er a t h e rt h a nb yi n t e r n a t i o n a lb o r r o w i n g .
Our calibration suggests that in Mexico taste shocks are smaller than in El Salvador. Repli-
cating the large positive correlation between government spending and output requires taste
shocks that are negatively correlated with output.
29Table 4: Business Cycle Statistics, MEXICO
Data Floating Economy Dollarized Economy
σx ρx,y ρx,g σx ρx,y ρx,g σx ρx,y ρx,g
Output 3.95 — 0.78 3.95 — 0.79 3.95 — 0.79
Government cons. 5.67 0.78 — 5.66 0.79 — 3.76 0.79 —
Private cons. 3.84 0.94 0.67 2.83 0.80 0.69 3.37 0.76 0.77
Inﬂation 19.10 -0.09 0.24 5.84 0.24 0.40 —— —
∆ net foreign public assets 1.31 0.41 0.14 2.10 0.64 0.28 0.30 0.35 -0.17
Borrowing constraint / GDP (%) 3.47 0.66
Mean money savings / GDP (%) 0.38 0.66
Mean debt / GDP (%) 1.66 0.19
Frequency constraint binds (%) 12.1 14.8
As was the case with El Salvador, the ﬂoating economy calibrated to Mexico successfully
matches many features of the data. Output and private and public consumption are strongly
positively correlated with each other. In our formulation of taste shocks, an increase in λ makes
households simultaneously value private consumption more and public consumption less, which
tends to make the correlation between the two negative. Productivity shocks, by contrast,
induce a positive correlation. Because productivity shocks are the most important source of
risk for Mexico, the model reproduces the strong positive correlation between public and private
consumption observed empirically.
The ﬂoating model economy also predicts a positive correlation between inﬂation and gov-
ernment spending, in line with Mexican data. A positive correlation emerges because the gov-
ernment ﬁnances taste-shock driven ﬂuctuations in government consumption by adjusting the
inﬂation tax rate. However, because periods of high output tend to be periods of high demand
for government consumption (ρλy < 0), the inﬂation rate does not have to ﬂuctuate too much
to deliver the eﬃcient level of government consumption. This is why the model fails to account
for the high volatility of inﬂation observed in Mexico. The model does match the procyclicality
of changes in foreign assets because debt is used to smooth output ﬂuctuations: the government
runs down its assets in periods of low output, and engages in precautionary savings in periods
of relatively high output.
Table 4 also presents statistics for the dollarized economy. Dollarization reduces international
ﬁnancial integration for Mexico by several metrics: the borrowing constraint is much tighter,
the change in net foreign assets is much less volatile, and the frequency of periods in which the
constraint binds is greater. Because dollarization means both the loss of an instrument and
the loss of credibility in international ﬁnancial markets, it comes as no surprise that welfare is
higher under a ﬂoat, on average by 0.2% of lifetime consumption.
306C o n c l u s i o n
This paper presents a simple model designed to study the interaction between the choice of
exchange rate regime and integration in international ﬁnancial markets. The advantage of a
ﬂoating regime is that control of the money growth rate and thus of seigniorage constitutes
a ﬂexible policy instrument for cushioning shocks. At the same time, dollarization may be
attractive precisely because eliminating the monetary instrument can strengthen incentives to
repay debts, and thereby increase access to international credit. This is a new way to think
about how relinquishing monetary independence may strengthen credibility. It is a complement
to the existing literature, which has largely focused on dollarization as a source of external
credibility in environments in which monetary independence would lead to excessive inﬂation.
We ﬁnd that the historical experience of countries that have delegated control of monetary
policy is consistent with the idea that dollarizing can make it easier for a country to borrow.
In particular, countries that have dollarized saw the cost of sovereign borrowing fall around the
time they abandoned the domestic currency.
An important message from our model is that the eﬀect of dollarization on ﬁnancial in-
tegration and on welfare depends critically on the type of shocks economies face, and on the
level of international interest rates. Low interest rates make dollarization especially attractive,
because debt becomes a very cheap instrument for smoothing ﬂuctuations. We also ﬁnd that
economies in which the demand for government revenue is counter-cyclical will likely experience
the greatest gains from relinquishing control of monetary policy. In part this is because debt is
used very actively to respond to shocks in this case. Thus the loss of the debt instrument in the
event of default is costly, which means that a lot of borrowing can be supported in equilibrium.
When calibrating our model to actual countries, El Salvador, which dollarized in 2001,
appears a better candidate for dollarization than Mexico. The model indicates that dollarization
in El Salvador should improve the country’s degree of integration with ﬁnancial markets, which
is consistent with empirical evidence, and can even increase consumer welfare. By contrast,
the model suggests that for Mexico dollarization would reduce access to foreign credit, since
demand side shocks appear small and government spending is pro-cyclical.
We conclude by noting that while the decision of whether to conduct an independent mone-
tary policy or to adopt another country’s currency is a very important one, the basic economic
mechanisms we emphasize in this paper have much broader potential application. In related
work, Krueger and Perri (2005) study the connection between the extent of government insur-
ance against idiosyncratic risk at the household level, and the depth of private domestic credit
markets. They ﬁnd that progressive taxation can increase incentives to default on private debts,
and thus crowd out private insurance. In the international arena, there are various examples
of international policy choices that shrink a country’s choice set for domestic policy, and which
may thereby increase a country’s access to international credit. One example is the decision to
31joint a customs union, such as the North American Free Trade Area, which requires candidate
member countries to give up control of taxes on trade. A second example is the Economic and
Monetary Union in Europe, which requires eliminating restrictions on cross-border ﬂows of cap-
ital and labor and thus limits countries’ ability to respond to shocks by adjusting domestic tax
rates. In these and many other examples the theory outlined in this paper suggests a connection
between the extent of domestic economic sovereignty and the treatment a country can expect
in sovereign debt markets.
32References
[1] Aguiar, M., and G. Gopinath. Emerging Market Business Cycles: The Cycle Is the Trend.
J o u r n a lo fP o l i t i c a lE c o n o m y ,f o r t h c o m i n g .
[2] Alesina, A., and R. Barro. 2002. Currency Unions. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(2),
409—436.
[3] Alvarez, F., and U. J. Jermann. 2000. Eﬃciency, Equilibrium, and Asset Pricing with Risk
of Default. Econometrica, 68(4), 775—798.
[4] Arellano, C. 2005. Default Risk and Income Fluctuations in Emerging Economies. Univer-
sity of Minnesota Working Paper.
[5] Bassetto, M. 2006. Fiscal Policy and Price Stability: The Case of Italy, 1992—98. Chicago
Fed Letter 233.
[6] Berg, A., and E. Borensztein. 2000. Full Dollarization: The Pros and Cons. IMF Policy
Discussion Paper, Washington DC.
[7] Bernoth, K., J. von Hagen, and L. Schuknecht. 2006. Sovereign Risk Premiums in the
European Government Bond Market. University of Bonn Working Paper.
[8] Calvo, G. 1999. On Dollarization. University of Maryland Working Paper.
[9] Calvo, G. 2001. Capital Markets and the Exchange Rate: with Special Reference to the
Dollarization Debate in Latin America. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking,3 3 ( 2 ) ,
312—334.
[10] Calvo, G. and P. Guidotti. 1993. On the Flexibility of Monetary Policy: The Case of the
Optimal Inﬂation Tax. Review of Economic Studies, 60(3), 667—687.
[11] Canzoneri M., and C. Rogers. 1990. Is the European Community an Optimal Currency
Area? Optimal Taxation Versus the Cost of Multiple Currencies. American Economic
Review, 80(3), 419—433.
[12] Chari, V.V., and Kehoe, P. 1999. Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy. In Handbook of
Macroeconomics,e d .J .B .T a y l o ra n dM .W o o d f o r d ,v o l .1 ,c h a p .2 6 ,1 6 7 1 — 1 7 4 5 ,E l s e v i e r .
[13] Click, R. 1998. Seigniorage in a Cross-Section of Countries. Journal of Money, Credit and
Banking, 30(2), 154—171.
[14] Cooley, T., and V. Quadrini. 2001. The Costs of Losing Monetary Independence: The Case
of Mexico. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 33(2), 370—397.
33[15] Cooper, R., and H. Kempf. 2001. Dollarization and the Conquest of Hyperinﬂation in
Divided Societies. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, 25(3), 3—12.
[16] Cooper, R., and H. Kempf. 2003. Commitment and the Adoption of a Common Currency.
International Economic Review, 44(1), 119—142.
[17] Cooper, R., and H. Kempf. 2004. Overturning Mundell: Fiscal Policy in a Monetary Union.
Review of Economic Studies, 71, 371—97.
[18] Edwards, S., 2001. Dollarization and Economic Performance: An Empirical Investigation.
NBER Working Paper 8274.
[19] Eichengreen B., and R. Hausmann. 2005. Other People’s Money: Debt Denomination and
Financial Instability in Emerging Market Economies. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
[20] Frankel, J., and A. Rose. 2002. An Estimate of the Eﬀect of Common Currencies Unions
on Trade and Income. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(2), 437—466.
[21] Hussey, R., and G. Tauchen. 1991. Quadrature-Based Methods for Obtaining Approximate
Solutions to Nonlinear Asset Pricing Models. Econometrica, 59(2), 371—396.
[22] Kletzer, K. M., and B. D. Wright. 2000. Sovereign Debt as Intertemporal Barter. American
Economic Review, 90(3), 621—639.
[23] Krueger, D., and F. Perri. 2005. Public versus Private Risk Sharing. University of Minnesota
Working Paper.
[ 2 4 ]L a n e ,P .2 0 0 6 .T h eR e a lE ﬀects of European Monetary Union. Journal of Economic Per-
spectives, 20(4), 47—66.
[25] Levy-Yeyati, E., and F. Sturzenegger. 2003. To Float or to Fix: Evidence on the Impact
of Exchange Rate Regimes on Growth. American Economic Review, 94(4), 1173—1193.
[26] Lucas, R., and N. Stokey. 1983. Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy in an Economy without
Capital. Journal of Monetary Economics, 12(1), 55—93.
[27] Mendoza, E. 2001. The Beneﬁts of Dollarization When Stabilization Policy Lacks Credi-
bility and Financial Markets Are Imperfect. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,3 3 ( 2 ) ,
440—474.
[28] Sargent, T. 2001. Comment on Fiscal Consequences for Mexico of Adopting the Dollar.
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 33(2), 619—625.
[29] Sims, C. 2001. Fiscal Consequences for Mexico of Adopting the Dollar. Journal of Money,
Credit and Banking, 33(2), 597—616.
34[30] Zhang, H. 1997. Endogenous Borrowing Constraints with Incomplete Markets. Journal of
Finance, 52(5), 2187—2209.
35Appendix
Proof for decentralization proposition in the ﬂoating economy
We want to show that the government in the monetary economy, in which control of the money
growth rate is the only way to reallocate resources between the public and private sectors, can
achieve the same allocations as a planner who can eﬀectively use lump-sum taxes and transfers
to redistribute freely period by period. In particular, we need to show that there exist sequences
for the money growth rates μ(st), associated savings rates x(st), and inﬂation rates π(st) that
satisfy (i) the consumer’s budget constraint (eq. 17) given the planner’s target values for private
consumption (eq. 27) (ii) the government’s budget constraint (eq. 6) given the planner’s target
values for government consumption (eq. 28), (iii) the conditions for household optimization
(eqs. 4 and 5).
Consider an arbitrary future date and state, T and sT, and an arbitrary feasible monetary
policy from sT onwards. For our desired decentralization result it is suﬃcient to show that for
all st and for all t ≤ T the planner in the monetary economy can implement any value for
c(st) ∈ (0,R(st)), where total resources R(st) are given by eq. 29, given an appropriate choice
for μ(st).
To show this we begin by making a few useful observations.
1. Because this is an endowment economy, neither money growth nor inﬂation have any
distortionary eﬀects on factor supplies.
2. Past monetary policy does not restrict the set of feasible allocations that can be achieved
looking forward, because current and future policy determine the real value of the pesos
consumers carry into the period, which is what matters for real allocations.20




, and in particular can implement the target value from eq. 27. We then work
backwards to compute the value for μ(sT−1) that delivers the target c(sT−1), exploiting the fact
that changes in μ(sT−1) do not impact c(sT−1,s T). In this fashion we can work backwards all the
way to period 0, along the way deriving sequences for μ(st),π (st+1) and x(st) that decentralize
the planner’s solution.
We guess, and will verify, that given a particular monetary policy from tomorrow onwards,
there will be a critical money growth rate μ(st) such that for any μ(st) ≥ μ(st) the money







μ(st,s t+1) − x(st,s t+1)
¶
(1 − τ)y(st,s t+1)
and thus does not depend on μ(st) or x(st).
36savings rate x(st) is constant and equal to zero, while for μ(st) < μ(st) the savings rate x(st) is
continuous and decreasing in μ(st), with the property that x(st) → 0 as μ(st) → μ(st).






then from the consumer’s budget constraint 17 it can be implemented with a money growth






where μ(st) ≥ μ(st) and x(st)=0 . In this case, the lower is the target value for c(st), the higher
is the required μ(st).A sμ(st) →∞ ,c (st) → 0. From eq. 18 the inﬂation rate π(st+1) in this










If the target value for c(st) is greater than c(st), then it will not be possible to implement in
a monetary economy without money savings. In this case, the required money growth rate will
be low or negative, savings x(st) will be positive, and the inter-temporal ﬁrst order condition for
money saving will be an equality. From the consumer’s budget constraint, eq. 17, c(st,s t+1) >
0 implies μ(st,s t+1) >x (st,s t+1) for all st+1. Given the expressions 17 and 18 for current
consumption and the inﬂation rate between t and t+1the inter-temporal ﬁrst order condition
equation implicitly deﬁnes x(st) as a continuous function of μ(st). In particular, the inter-











μ(st)(μ(st,s t+1;Λt+1) − x(st,s t+1;Λt+1))y(st)
(33)
Using eq. 17 to express consumption as a function of x(st) and μ(st) gives
λ(st)μ(st)









(μ(st,s t+1) − x(st,s t+1;Λt+1))
(34)
It is immediate from this expression that the savings rate x(st) is everywhere decreasing in
μ(st).21 For μ(st) ≤ μ(st), given (i) a continuation policy Λt+1, (ii) future money growth rates
21Here is some intuition for the response of x(st) to μ(st). Absent a change in the savings rate, a reduction in
the money growth rate μ(st) reduces the current price level P(st) and increases expected inﬂation π(st+1), which
tends to reduce savings. It also increases current consumption, and reduces the marginal utility of consumption,
making consumers want to save more. With no change in the savings rate the second eﬀect would dominate,
leaving the marginal utility of consumption at st too low (see 34). Of course, in equilibrium prices and decisions
adjust so that the household’s inter-temporal ﬁrst order condition is satisﬁed. The equilibrium adjustment
mechanism is that the expected inﬂation rate rises by more than under the no-savings-adjustment hypothsis,
and the savings rate rises. This increase in the savings rate is consistent with the inﬂation dynamic, and the
37μ(st,s t+1), (iii) future savings rates x(st,s t+1;Λt+1), a n d( i v )f u t u r ec o n s u m p t i o nc(st,s t+1;Λt+1),
the current money growth rate μ(st) is deﬁned by the solution to eq. 34 when the money savings
rate x(st) is given by re-arranging eq. 17, i.e.
x(s
t)=
c(st)μ(st) − (1 − τ)y(st)
c(st) − (1 − τ)y(st)
(35)
The critical money growth rate μ(st) is the value of μ(st) that solves 34 when x(st)=0 . For
μ(st) > μ(st) the inter-temporal ﬁrst order condition will be a strict inequality with x(st)=0 ,
conﬁrming the guess that for money growth rates exceeding μ(st), household maximization will
imply no money saving.
The important point relating to our decentralization result is that with log utility the savings
rate x(st) is uniformly decreasing in the money growth rate μ(st). The implication is that if the
government had inﬁnite resources, it could make seigniorage arbitrarily small and consumption
arbitrarily large by reducing μ(st) t o w a r d st h ep o i n ta tw h i c hx(st)=μ(st) (see eq. 17). In
practice, the government always has at least R(st)−(1−τ)y(st) resources from direct taxation
and international borrowing. So it can reduce the money growth rate to the point at which
seigniorage is equal to the negative of this number, in which case c(st)=R(st). Thus we have
shown that the monetary authority can implement any value for c(st) ∈ (0,R(st)) with an
appropriate choice for μ(st).
Corollary: Equilibrium uniqueness
There is a unique monetary equilibrium in our economy. This follows immediately from the
fact that the savings rate x(st) is everywhere decreasing in μ(st). In particular, for any policy
ΛT+1 deﬁning policy from period T +1and onwards, each possible money growth rate μ(sT) at
sT implies a unique value for x(sT) and thus for c(sT) and π(sT,s T+1). A similar argument can
be applied, recursively, at each date t ≤ T.
reduced return to saving reduces the right hand side of the intertemporal ﬁrst order condition. At the same
time, a higher savings rate actually increases equilibrium consumption (see eq. 17), reducing the left hand side
of the ﬁrst order condition, but for log utility the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates.
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